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Introduction 
In an earlier article,1 I established parallels between kitsch and bullshit. 
Both traffic in snaring the unsophisticated, be it in the form of ‘collectible’ 
enamelware or self-help books written by pseudo-experts. Both distort the 
truth through exaggeration, a willful lack of critical activity, or by simply 
not being serious. My question in the earlier article was whether kitsch can 
overlap with bullshit in a sort of ‘aesthetic bullshit’? If we understand 
‘aesthetic’ as a quality related to beauty or ugliness most broadly construed, 
it could seem that kitsch is working much more with aesthetic categories 
such as pleasure and indulgence while bullshit is predominantly an ethical 
instance. However, in both kitsch and bullshit the limit between ethics and 
aesthetics becomes blurred. The production of bullshit is related to 
aesthetics, which is why kitsch and bullshit often appear together, for 
example in the art of Jeff Koons, who not only employs kitsch in an 
ironical way, but also attaches typical statements of bullshit to those 
statements. 
The above reflections are based on Harry Frankfurt’s influential 
definition of bullshit as the deceptive misrepresentation of reality that 
remains different from lying because, contrary to the liar, the “bullshitter” 
does not try to deceive.2 What matters for Frankfurt is not the facts’ truth 
value but the bullshitter’s “state of mind.” The bullshitter is bluffing but not 
lying. While the liar covers the truth under a non-truth that he wants to be 
as substantial and dense as possible, bullshit makes non-substantial claims 
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in order to create new, less substantial realities that will probably not be 
able to perfectly conceal the more substantial true reality. I suggested that 
kitsch works along similar lines. The bullshitter’s free interpretation of 
reality does not follow the rules of a perfect crime but rather those of 
playful manipulation, which is similar to kitsch. Like bullshit, kitsch does 
not consistently transgress the limits that distinguish the authentic from the 
false but plays with them. Both kitsch and bullshit exaggerate and they are 
often simultaneously too superficial and too explicit. They do not simply 
hide the truth. Bullshit is not a lie and kitsch is not forgery. This means that 
both kitsch and bullshit are not false, but merely fake and phony attempts to 
establish a new reality, which is an alternative reality “not inferior to the 
real thing.” 3  Most typically, people are not forced to believe in this 
misrepresented reality but the ‘real’ reality is not entirely dissimulated. 
In the present article I want to drive the comparison further and 
examine whether it is possible to be fascinated or attracted by bullshit in the 
same way in which one can be fascinated by kitsch. Kitsch is boastful, 
exaggerated and ‘not quite true’; still it can be attractive when it is 
aesthetically pleasing. Is the same true for bullshit? In order to answer this 
question, I analyze the relationships that both kitsch and bullshit maintain 
with pretentiousness, self-deception, cheating, and seduction. The latter 
will be clarified by using Jean Baudrillard’s scheme of seduction as a play 
with ‘weak’ signifiers. All processes show that ethical and aesthetical 
perceptions of kitsch and bullshit do often overlap. 
 
Sympathizing with Kitsch and Bullshit 
Kitsch is difficult to define but there definitely is a common understanding 
of kitsch at least among those people who know what kitsch is. Normally, 
kitsch is perceived as an aesthetic product depending on exaggerated 
sentimentality, banality, superficiality, and triteness. It has also been 
defined as “artistic deficiency,” 4  as an overly formulaic aesthetic 
expression,5  or as an aesthetic phenomenon contradicting the “law of 
adequacy.”6 While there is apparently no classical definition of kitsch, most 
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authors would agree that kitsch can be: 1) a tasteless copy of an existing 
style; or 2) the systematic display of an artistic (though not necessarily 
technical) deficiency. 
In spite of its predominantly negative connotations, kitsch and 
bullshit are able to evoke a considerable amount of sympathy among the 
public. Most bullshit is blunt, but in particular cases we might like the 
bluntness, be it only because its production obviously required a 
considerable amount of intelligence. In commercial slogans, for example, 
bluntness can almost become an art. Above that, very often bullshit 
expresses secondary claims (which Frankfurt observes with interest) with 
which we can sympathize; and sometimes those secondary claims could 
hardly be expressed otherwise than through bullshit. 
In principle there are three ways of dealing with kitsch and bullshit: 
a) to reject them because one has recognized them as kitsch/bullshit and 
one does not want to deal with them; b) to accept them because one does 
not realize that one is confronted with kitsch/bullshit but believes them to 
be true claims or true art; c) to accept them though one has recognized them 
as kitsch/bullshit but one finds the illusion they purport pleasant an 
enjoyable as long they remain confined to certain quantitative limits.7 
The engineering department of a minor college in the United States 
has lost its accreditation and when it finally gets it back after three years of 
tense struggle, the college’s president announces in his speech that the 
accrediting body “simply had to give the accreditation back, because how 
can they not accredit the best engineering department in the whole 
country?” Everybody in the room knows that what the president is saying is 
false, even ridiculously false, but he is not lying. It is even possible to 
sympathize with him because he wants to encourage the department and 
perhaps make them feel less embarrassed about having lost the 
accreditation in the first place. A pragmatic analysis will also state that 
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people who sympathize with the speaker’s political position in general, will 
forgive the bullshit more easily. But they will not believe it. The pragmatic 
goals of the bullshit will be recognized and the speaker will not be held to 
account for the accuracy. 
In its hopeless exaggeration, in its naïve simplicity, but also 
because of its vibrating self-indulgence, the president’s claim is not only 
classic bullshit, but comes close to kitsch. His statement has the effect of 
moral reassurance that is a common feature of kitsch as will be shown 
below. And, of course, like kitsch, we can appreciate or bear his words only 
as long as they are used sparingly; if he repeated his claim on a weekly 
basis, we might accuse him of brainwashing and manipulation of the 
students’ sense of reality. Unfortunately, both bullshit and kitsch tend to 
follow certain repetitive patterns that provide novelty value only on rare 
occasions. 
Apart from that, the ethical evaluation depends on the audience that 
has been addressed. Those students are educated people and the president 
knows that most probably they will not take his words for granted. The 
same action could become morally abject when carried out in front of an 
entirely uneducated audience. Scott Kimbrough notes that “we sympathize 
with the liar’s victim but not with the bullshitter’s” and judge that the 
victims of bullshit “allow themselves to be mentally lazy and blinded by 
desire.”8 In the above case, anybody who takes the college president’s 
words for granted is more naive than even the president expected; the 
bullshitting technique was too obvious and nobody was forced to believe in 
his ‘reality.’ 
The example works in parallel with the perception of kitsch. Some 
people find the sporadic presence of kitsch acceptable as long as it does not 
interfere with their critical distance towards kitsch. They want to know that 
it is kitsch and remain able to draw the limit between kitsch and real art. In 
other words, they want to keep a ‘cool’ distance towards what they identify 
as kitsch. Then they might decide to enjoy a sentimental song, a funny but 
tacky commercial, an eccentric armchair in their living room that is 
‘normally’” too colorful but still interesting. Only when they appreciate 
kitsch as kitsch are they able to play with certain kitsch motives in a ‘cool’ 
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fashion and appreciate them in the form of “self-conscious subversions [or] 
as part of irony.”9 In other words, paradoxically, just because they see 
kitsch as kitsch, kitsch no longer functions as kitsch. The enjoyment is now 
controlled by an aesthetic sensibility that is not merely dependent on kitsch. 
Camp is very much based on this ironical attitude towards kitsch, as are 
‘postmodern’ ways of using kitsch motives in order to challenge official 
aesthetic standards. The above consumers of kitsch do not want to be 
overwhelmed by kitsch. The pattern corresponds to Milan Kundera’s 
concept of self-conscious kitsch, that is, the fact of “knowing that kitsch is 
kitsch” – which makes that here kitsch is not kitsch at all. Kundera writes: 
“As soon as kitsch is recognized for the lie it is, it moves into the context of 
non-kitsch… becoming as touching as any other human weakness.”10 
The latter option is unique to bullshit and kitsch, and it is based on 
the assumption that both kitsch and bullshit are not entirely immoral or, 
more precisely, that their existence is linked to the sort of playful (though 
not complete) relativism that is proper to judgments in the realm of 
aesthetics. Kundera is even more radical because for him, the fact of 
“knowing that kitsch is kitsch” is a reason to exempt kitsch from ethical 
requirements altogether. 
 
Narcissism and Self-Enjoyment 
Frankfurt bases a great deal of his concept of bullshit on the analysis of 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s reaction to his friend Fania Pascal who claimed, 
after having undergone throat surgery, that she now feels like a “dog who 
has just been run over.” Wittgenstein dismisses her words as ‘nonsense’” 
because she cannot really know what “a dog who has just been run over” 
feels like. Frankfurt believes that Wittgenstein interprets Pascal’s statement 
as bullshit. The term Unsinn (nonsense) used by Wittgenstein, just like the 
stronger term Schwachsinn, is indeed the most likely word that any German 
speaker would use to designate bullshit in German. True, Pascal is not 
simply talking nonsense. However, what disgusts Wittgenstein is that she 
“is not even concerned whether her statement is correct”11 and this permits 
                                                
9 Tomáš Kulka, Kitsch and Art (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 
1996), p. 9. 
10 Milan Kundera, The Unbearable Lightness of Being (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), p. 
256. 
11 Frankfurt, On Bullshit, p. 31. 
Kitsch and Bullshit 
Literature & Aesthetics 26 2016 6 
its classification as bullshit. We might also say that her statement is kitsch 
because, as Frankfurt suggests, “her characterization of her feeling is too 
specific; it is excessively particular.”12 What Pascal’s statement shares with 
kitsch is indeed that it is overly particular. Kitsch makes the shoes only red 
until we see only their redness, or it over-emphasizes a few sentimental 
details in a film until we no longer care about the film’s other 
cinematographic aspects. Dorfles’ analysis of kitsch as an aesthetics that 
has “isolated one single aspect of the artistic phenomenon”13 and which it 
will subsequently exaggerate provides one of the most pertinent definitions 
of kitsch. The description of her state like that of “dog who has just been 
run over” is too concrete, which dramatizes the situation in a strange way. 
Frankfurt says that Wittgenstein probably found the particular 
character that Pascal attributes to her feeling inappropriate, which is 
another characteristics of kitsch: “Hers is not just any bad feeling but the 
distinctive bad feeling that a dog has when it is run over.”14 The fact of 
providing inadequate words, feelings, or images is also a feature of kitsch. 
On the other hand, not everything inadequate is automatically kitsch. 
Kitsch, just like what happens in Pascal’s statement, often places wrong 
metaphors into wrong context; still not every badly placed metaphor is 
kitsch. What is important for kitsch is how things are placed. When the 
aesthetics works apparently carelessly, by boldly disregarding reality 
though it is there right in front of our eyes, then the result is likely to be 
kitsch. Or it will be kitsch when it disregards the minimum requirements 
generally believed to be necessary in order to qualify as art. It is clear that 
all this also concerns bullshit, and Frankfurt’s explanations make this clear. 
In spite of the ‘mistakes’ that Pascal might have committed, neither 
Pascal nor producers of kitsch are lying. Wittgenstein seems to hold her 
accountable for making a false statement but the ‘fussiness’ of this attitude 
is inappropriate because he confuses an aesthetic mistake with an ethical 
mistake. Though Pascal might indeed have made a kitsch or a bullshit 
statement, most people would find that Wittgenstein has been unusually 
harsh in criticizing her for this (and Frankfurt believes this, too). Pascal is 
not pretending to give an accurate account of her situation. She simply feels 
like she has a full body blow, like an encounter with a large object, and so 
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she gives an analogy. It is more or less appropriate to the situation and 
Wittgenstein seems to be grasping at straws. Pascal’s only mistake is that 
she puts ‘too much’ into her statement and that she places it into an 
inadequate context. Therefore she or any kitsch producer will normally be 
judged in terms of aesthetics rather than of ethics. Even Wittgenstein says 
that Pascal’s statement is neither false nor unethical but simply that it is 
‘nonsense.’ On the other hand, he does not criticize her in terms of 
aesthetics either. What is he actually criticizing? His bullshit reproach 
offers a peculiar ethico-aesthetical criticism. 
Imagine a poet who has written a line that goes “I felt like a dog 
who has just been run over.” Can we call this bullshit? No, because here it 
does not matter that the poet cannot really know what that dog feels like. 
As a matter of fact, a poet does not have to be overly concerned with 
reality. Would it then be kitsch? No, because the poet has the right to 
describe feelings in a particular fashion and the phrase is not hackneyed or 
overused. 
The bullshitter acts like a poet but within a situation where she is 
not supposed to act like a poet, and this is a particular ethico-aesthetical 
mistake. Pascal is doing exactly this. Like a poet, she does not care about 
the contextual reality, but still she pretends to give Wittgenstein a more or 
less accurate account of her situation. This is also the reason why those 
same words can be understood as kitsch: their poetical content is 
inappropriate in this particular context. The situation can be compared to 
somebody reciting Stéphane Mallarmé’s “Dame sans trop d’ardeur” in a 
business meeting and who will subsequently be accused of producing a 
kitsch-like setting. Mallarmé’s poem is not kitsch, but the way in which it 
is used is kitsch. It is like hanging an authentic Rembrandt in an elevator. 
More importantly, we might find a trace of self-indulgence or 
perhaps even self-enjoyment in Pascal’s statement, and this might have 
disturbed Wittgenstein in the first place. For Giesz, kitsch is the “self-
enjoyment” in which the “enjoyer enjoys himself”15 and Frankfurt sees the 
same kind of self-sufficiency and narcissism (the fact that she is concerned 
only about her own nature and not that of the context) as essential for 
bullshit. 16  Denis Dutton pointed out that kitsch is very much about 
narcissism because we do not merely “find it in the area of religious or 
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sentimental art… but in philosophy and intellectual discourse as well. It is 
plain that a strong sense of self-congratulation and attempted self-
justification.”17 The self-enjoyment of the kitsch consumer becomes also 
clear in Kundera’s scheme of the ‘two tears” constituting this particular 
aesthetic experience: “The first tear says: how nice to see children running 
on the grass! The second tear says: How nice to be moved, together with all 
mankind, by children running on the grass! It is the second tear that makes 
kitsch kitsch.”18 Finally, also Max Black perceives in humbug (which is, 
according to Frankfurt, closely related to bullshit) a “whiff of self-
satisfaction and self-complacency.”19 The bullshitter enjoys his bullshit in 
the same way in which the kitsch lover enjoys kitsch. The conclusion is that 
kitsch and bullshit are most likely to happen not when ethics is bluntly 
abandoned but when aesthetics is misused in order to make inappropriate 
statements in a real world context. 
 
Pretentiousness 
The pretentiousness of bullshit has recently received academic attention in 
a study of ‘pseudo-profound’ bullshit in management. The authors state 
that vagueness of meaning typical for pseudo-profound bullshit has been 
propelled by the twitter limitation of messages to 140 characters. 20 
Pretentious bullshit is also the target of the online software called the New 
Age Bullshit Generator (http://sebpearce.com/bullshit/), which detects 
pretentious religious (or pseudo-religious) bullshit. Pretentiousness was 
already the topic of Kundera’s kitsch examinations. In The Unbearable 
Lightness of Being, Kundera advances the concept of kitsch as the “denial 
of shit,” which corresponds to the idea of pretentious bullshit: saying that 
we are the best though obviously we are the worst (thus denying the shit 
around us) is pretentious. At first sight, Kundera’s understanding of kitsch 
might appear as unusual because kitsch has often been called trash or 
“artistic rubbish.” This was most famously explained by Dorfles when 
insisting on the German linguistic connection with “collecting rubbish from 
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the street.”21 Also Greenberg emphasized that kitsch uses “for raw material 
the debased and academicized simulacra of genuine culture.”22 Further, 
given the parallelism with bullshit, how can Kundera characterize as 
“shitless” the very element that carries shit in its name? 
Kundera’s focus is on the perfectionism of kitsch. The shiny 
productions of kitsch are often the elaborations of minds that leave nothing 
to chance. For Kundera, kitsch negates reality by excluding “everything 
from its purview which is essentially unacceptable in human existence.”23 
This is how the ‘denial of shit’ needs to be understood. The example of the 
college president also presents ‘shitless bullshit’ because: is there anything 
more ‘shitless’ than a world in which the country’s worst department still 
remains the country’s best? 
The problem is that Kundera does not make any effort to review his 
‘kitsch as a lie’ pattern in a more complex context provided by the 
particular ethico-aesthetic status of bullshit. Kundera belongs to the group 
of people who equate kitsch (which is for him mainly a propaganda 
phenomenon) with brainwashing. Like Hermann Broch before him, 
Kundera thinks that kitsch is inalterably evil.24 An ironic production or 
consumption of kitsch (or bullshit) is unthinkable for him because the 
communist kitsch world that Kundera experienced was presented as a 
utopian world from which all irony had been banished.25 In communism 
kitsch and bullshit became as serious as religion, and this tradition has even 
been perpetuated until today. When Korean leader Kim Jong Il died in 
2011, North Korean papers reported that a Manchurian crane was observed 
flying three times around the Kim family monument. The unusually cold 
weather was also ascribed to the leader’s death. This is pretentious bullshit 
(working with images of kitsch), but it becomes fraud should the 
population really be brainwashed enough to believe in it. The government 
was addressing a public that had perhaps no choice but really believing in 
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it. In other countries political bullshit might be taken with humor and will 
not follow the strict rules of brainwashing. All this also shows that the 
question whether something should be identified as bullshit/kitsch or not 
depends on the consumer as much as on the producer as well as on the 
relationship between them. 
In the cases of the college president as well as the North Korean 
propaganda, we can detect a solid amount of pretentiousness. The 
Wittgenstein-Pascal case is different. True, Pascal pretended to give a more 
or less accurate account of her situation though in the end she was not. 
However, this is not pretentious. We also detected a certain amount of self-
indulgence and self-enjoyment in Pascal’s statement, which is precisely 
what Wittgenstein found appalling. He found it appalling in the same way 
in which many people find kitsch and bullshit appalling. But it was not 
pretentious. 
To make the point about the pretentiousness clearer it is necessary 
to spell out more precisely what people can find appalling in pretentious 
bullshit and kitsch. The main problem with kitsch and bullshit is that often 
they do not enrich our (social, aesthetic, and so on) experiences in a 
meaningful way. Often we dismiss them by saying that this is ‘simply’ 
kitsch or ‘simply’ bullshit. However, this alone should merely make us 
indifferent towards kitsch and bullshit. Still, some people get really 
annoyed. Why? If they find kitsch and bullshit appalling it is not 
necessarily because they feel that kitsch and bullshit are at the root of an 
unfair treatment or that they have been cheated. Most typically they feel 
‘bullshitted’ when somebody is trying to talk them into something by using 
obviously false conclusions whilst hiding the premises. What they dislike 
in those cases is the pretentiousness that is often linked to kitsch and 
bullshit. In this sense, we can say that Wittgenstein was overly sensitive 
because the slightest trace of self-indulgence reminded him of 
pretentiousness. Pretentiousness occurs when the bullshitter herself seems 
to believe and at the same time not to believe in her own bullshit; and this 
state of mind manifests itself very often as self-indulgence and self-
enjoyment. Kundera’s ‘shitless word’ as well as Pascal’s case (though to a 
lesser degree) are examples of the latter two. On the other hand, Pascal is 
not really pretentious because her self-indulgence and self-enjoyment are 
not very strong (though still strong enough to annoy Wittgenstein). 
Let me give a better example. The college’s email address is 
excellence@tfu.edu.com. There was really no reason to put the word 
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‘excellence’ into that place. Throwing around the word ‘excellence’ like 
this makes it meaningless and trite. The value of real excellence has been 
debased, which is a typical feature of kitsch. Excellence must be worked 
for and not merely mentioned in the most inappropriate places. The college 
might defend itself by saying that for them excellence is so important and 
primordial that they decided to use it in their email address. We cannot 
refute this but it seems unlikely. A typical reaction would be to ask them: 
“Do you really believe in what you are saying?” The problem is that they 
do believe in it and at the same time they do not believe in it – and this is 
pretentious. It comes close to what German dictionaries occasionally 
suggest as a translation of bullshit: ‘Quatsch mit Sosse,’ which means 
‘nonsense served with a sauce’ in order to make it aesthetically more 
appealing. What the college is doing is not merely boastful. If they were 
boasting we could hold them morally accountable for not saying the truth. 
Here we are put into a much more complicated situation that comes closer 
to the task of explaining why a certain work of art is bad and not good. This 
shows how pretentiousness can shift bullshit from ethics to aesthetics. The 
college is not lying nor does it affirm something in which it does absolutely 
not believe. It simply invented what it can consider as an aesthetic 
embellishment and it seems to believe in this embellishment alone; it does 
not necessarily believe in the reality itself. Through this confusion of 
aesthetics and reality, things got out of control. In the end, the college has 
put itself in a situation where it is no longer able to control the use of an 
important word such as ‘excellence’. 
Frankfurt attaches much importance to pretentiousness as a 
motivation of bullshit.26 It is what distinguishes, in his opinion, bullshit 
from humbug (as defined by Max Black) though Frankfurt also recognizes 
that “it must not be assumed that bullshit always and necessarily has 
pretentiousness as its motive.”27 First, not everybody who pretends is 
pretentious. The real estate agent who cheats me into signing up for a 
hyperreal loan scheme pretends that the loan system is entirely safe though 
it is not; he is not pretentious. He is simply lying. 
In some instances of pretentious bullshit, the bullshitter is really 
lying (consciously or unconsciously) but without taking care to dissimulate 
the truth properly. This is unintentional pretentious bullshit, which is 
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different from unconscious bullshit where the bullshitter believes she is 
telling the truth. In unintentional pretentious bullshit the bullshitter is trying 
to lie but her lies remain on the level of bullshit. 
Unconscious bullshit obviously happens relatively often because 
bullshit has an intrinsic illusionist component and is often close to self-
hypnotization. Should the bullshitter really not be aware at all of her 
bullshit, she strikes us as naïve but not as pretentious because there is no 
motivation (either good or bad) behind her act. 
Then there is the liar who desperately tries to become a bullshitter 
by saying, “But I thought that this would not matter.” She is not pretentious 
but simply defending herself. In any case, ‘pretentious bullshit’ (which 
Frankfurt identifies as a stock phrase, p. 11) is worse than regular bullshit 
because it annoys us, but in moral terms, it is not as bad as regular lying. 
Kitsch works along similar lines. When bullshitters and kitsch-
people boast about their (non-existing) capacities or about the (imaginary) 
artistic value of their latest ‘art’ purchase from the tourist souvenir stand we 
can either see them as victims of a reality scheme that has kept them in the 
dark for whatever reason; or we can find them annoying because they are 
trying to talk us into something. In the latter case, kitsch and bullshit lose 
their playful input and become pretentious because they start becoming 
serious strategies. What is annoying is the believe/not-believe state of mind 
of the person who talks about kitsch. When she is pretentious, she 
‘somehow’ knows very well that it is kitsch but she does not want to admit 
it, possibly not even in front of herself. 
Kitsch and bullshit are often guided by monetary or political 
motives, but they become particularly pretentious and annoying when those 
motives move to the foreground. Of course, this concerns the kitsch 
producer and not the kitsch consumer who will be a victim of those 
strategies. In the end, the college president was guided by monetary 
motives because he did not want engineering students to leave the 
department. But those motives were not too obvious, he did not appear 
greedy and, as explained above, he did not insist too much on his false 
claim. This is why here pretentiousness remains secondary. 
We are annoyed that the real estate promoter presents the gorily 
decorated apartment that is obviously tuned to the taste of his nouveau 
riche clientele, as tasteful and up to high-class standards. We are also 
annoyed when looking at the apartment’s price because the tons of marble 
and fake gold have made it unnecessarily expensive. However, the kitsch 
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items themselves are not annoying but might even evoke our pity; what is 
annoying is the fact that here, kitsch is sold as non-kitsch or, in other 
words, that bullshit has moved closer to a lie (without really being one). 
We find the promoter pretentious because she takes kitsch for the real thing 
(or pretends to do so) and imposes her false judgments upon us in the name 
of profit. Still we remain in the realm of taste and aesthetics and a remnant 
of the matter’s playfulness prevents us from calling this fraud. 
The following example, on the other hand, is not pretentious 
because here we are dealing with false facts. The politician’s declarations 
about the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq might merely 
strike us as a typical bullshitting discourse aiming to gain the sympathy of 
certain voters; everyday politics abounds with such declarations. However, 
when the bullshit is taken seriously enough to serve as a reason for 
invading a country, then bullshit has become a lie incurring a crime against 
humanity. To some people such cases might appear as bullshit because of 
their ‘virtual’ character, meaning that those ‘facts’ have assumed a reality 
status without anybody having made an explicit effort to declare them to be 
real: “I am only asking to see President Obama’s birth certificate, I am not 
saying that he was not born in the US,” said Donald Trump. However, in 
spite of their indirect strategy and the attempt to make them look less 
serious than they actually are, those statements are lies and not bullshit. 
Correspondingly, in those cases we are not dealing with kitsch either. There 
is nothing kitschy in those statements apart from the indirect link with 
overly patriotic expressions of the love of the country. 
 
Self-Deception 
As soon as the bullshitter believes in her own bullshit she is not pretentious 
but simply naïve. As mentioned, in the ideal cases of kitsch and bullshit 
(and these are the only cases where we can sympathize with them), the 
‘real’ reality should never be entirely dissimulated. This is also important 
for Frankfurt. Some people decide to believe in bullshit to some degree, 
that is, they do not ‘really’ believe in it but temporarily enjoy it like a 
fiction or a computer game. They are not engaging in this half-believe 
because they are pretentious. Commercials are typical producers of bullshit 
as well as of kitsch, but normally their images enter our minds not in the 
form of an accepted reality, but rather as pleasant illusions that we like to 
entertain within certain limits. 
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I might choose to ‘believe’ in the authentically German 
craftsmanship of my dearly paid car though I know perfectly well that most 
of the car’s parts were made in Turkey. However, nobody would classify 
this as a serious act of self-deception. The point is that I do not exactly 
know what percent of my car should be considered German and what 
percent Turkish and it is this blurred state of reality that invites a playful 
acceptance of bullshit. In those cases we join the bullshitter or producer of 
kitsch at least temporarily in their “indifference to how things really are,” to 
put it in Frankfurt’s terms. 28  It is important to express this as an 
indifference, not as a fanatical adherence to another reality. We must be 
ready to give up our illusions without difficulty and at any moment. 
Otherwise we are victims of bullshit or, technically speaking, of fraud. 
Max Black has attempted to prove self-deception impossible 
because if humbug (or fraud) requires concealment of a deceptive intent, 
the speaker and the audience cannot be identical: “The following argument 
for the impossibility of self-deception seems to be conclusive: Humbug 
requires concealment of a deceptive intent; but if the speaker and the 
audience are identical, as in soliloquy, there can be no such concealment; 
so there can be no such thing as self-deception.”29 However, Black admits 
that all this is only true for straightforward situations in which real 
concealment took place, that is, for “first-degree humbug”: “For second-
degree humbug, produced by a self-deluded speaker or thinker, the 
unsatisfactory reference to thoughts and so on would need to be replaced by 
something like ‘thoughts… that might be revealed by candid and rational 
self-examination.’”30 Black would probably call the case of the German-
Turkish car ‘second degree humbug.’31 
Unfortunately, the limits that separate self-deception from the mere 
play with partial deception are flimsy. In general – if at all – bullshit and 
kitsch are able to blur the distinction between reality and non-reality or 
between art and non-art, only slightly; but just because the limits are only 
slightly altered, the alteration can be rather consistent and durable. This is 
why Frankfurt says that, “bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies 
                                                
28 Frankfurt, On Bullshit, p. 34. 
29 Black, ‘The Prevalence of Humbug’, p. 138. 
30 Black, ‘The Prevalence of Humbug’, p. 143. 
31 Black, ‘The Prevalence of Humbug’, p. 143. 
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are.”32 The point is that the bullshitter “does not reject the authority of the 
truth, as the liar does, and opposes himself to it. He pays no attention to it 
at all.”33 In this situation it is less likely that proofs will be searched for and 
that falsehood will be detected. Bullshit can last longer simply because it 
has declared that truth is not ‘otherwise’ but merely ‘unimportant.’ It is also 
through this device that bullshit can even engage our participation or 
enjoyment. And this ‘enjoyment’ factor is, of course, also very important 
for kitsch. It can be concluded, in parallel with Frankfurt’s statement, that 
kitsch is a greater enemy of art than fake art. 
 
Cheating 
‘Cheating’ sounds less severe than ‘deceiving’. Cheating takes advantage 
of the fact that the limits between bullshit and lying (or kitsch and fraud) 
are often difficult to establish, that they are fluid and manifest various 
degrees. The junior high school student who has cheated on the math exam 
might really believe that she is ‘cool’ because she managed to delude an 
authoritarian system and got away with it. Moral concerns do not affect her. 
The German and French languages use special words for cheating on exams 
(pfuschen, tricher) in order to distinguish this act from that of normal 
deceiving. Pfuschen or tricher is a lighter form of deceiving/cheating. 
Contrary to the latter, pfuschen and tricher are intransitive verbs, which 
seemingly cancels a part of their ethical implications. One cannot 
pfuschen/tricher somebody, but one does it on one’s own, which sounds 
very much as if there is no victim. 
Some people think that religion is bullshit but they would not hold 
the ‘bullshitting’ priest accountable for fraud. The leader of a sect, on the 
other hand, will more commonly be accused of deceiving and lying. The 
same goes for religious fundamentalists who insist on the absolute 
character of some absurd dogmas and turn religion into a sort of science-
based ideology. Creationism for example, turns from bullshit into fraud 
when it is no longer presented as a culturally determined worldview but as 
a scientific theory. George Reisch has doubts whether creationism fits 
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Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit because advocates of creationism “are 
plainly not indifferent to truth.”34 
The bullshitter can or cannot be indifferent towards the truth but in 
any case she invites us to be indifferent towards truth though she knows 
that, at least theoretically, the truth is present and accessible to everyone. 
She invites us to ignore the elephant in the room. Because, in most cases, 
this strategy cannot be carried out along the lines of a perfect brainwashing: 
bullshit will remain bullshit. If, however, serious attempts are made to 
negate reality throughout, then creationism turns into fraud. Fraud happens 
when creationists attempt to publish their Intelligent Design theories in 
serious scientific journals or create their own journals for that purpose and 
advertise them as academically sanctioned (the reality of creationism 
promotion is obviously more complicated than can be dealt with in this 
short space, but it has been well analyzed by Reisch). 
How does this work with regard to kitsch? There are examples 
where kitsch has been advertised as science. Ugo Volli mentions the case of 
a piece of pornography (which he sees as an example of kitsch because it is 
too explicit) that has been declared to be merely a scientific study of 
sexuality.35 If people really believe this, kitsch becomes fraud. There are 
numerous other cases where kitsch is advertised as non-kitsch though the 
strategy is less obvious. The quasi kitsch-religion that invades 
contemporary brains in the form of a mind-numbing television culture is 
acceptable as long as people are left the choice to watch other programs and 
see other realities. Television as a media is different from cinema because 
through its permanency, it pervades peoples’ minds in a more 
‘brainwashing’ fashion. Through television, kitsch (and bullshit) is often 
forced upon people in such a consistent manner that they simply cannot 
escape. Here kitsch becomes fraud. The kitsch painting sold in the galley of 
the local mall, on the other hand, remains kitsch because the seller is 
merely bullshitting. Kitsch as fraud can also happen when kitsch is 
systematically employed in architecture. Wherever kitsch takes over too 
much of reality (the media or the built environment) it turns into the 
exclusive kind of reality that is similar to the reality offered by sects. 
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Seduction 
This pattern is in perfect agreement with Jean Baudrillard’s scheme of 
seduction as a play with ‘weak’ signifiers. For Baudrillard, seduction 
always “lies with the annulment of the signs, of their meaning, with their 
pure appearance.” 36  Strong kitsch and bullshit are not seductive but 
annoying. Normally kitsch and bullshit are strategies of exaggeration 
relying on the ‘completeness’ of signification. In this sense, they do not 
seduce but violate. However, if bullshit and kitsch seduce, this must always 
happen through weakness: “To seduce is to appear weak. To seduce is to 
render weak. We seduce with our weakness, never with strong signs or 
powers. In seduction we enact this weakness and this is what gives seduction 
its strength.”37 In general, we can be seduced by kitsch or bullshit when it 
is ‘weak’ but are repelled when it is ‘strong.’ Baudrillard classifies 
seduction as a ludic activity because of “the capacity immanent to seduction 
to deny things their truth and turn it into a game, the pure play of 
appearances, and thereby [to] foil all systems of power and meaning with a 
mere turn of the hand.” 38  What rules in seduction is a “principle of 
uncertainty,”39 which means that kitsch and bullshit can exercise a “power 
of attraction and distraction, of absorption and fascination”40 that should 
never be too strong. The persuasion should always remain incomplete and 
the process should be playful, mobile, and diffuse. When kitsch and bullshit 
can be constructed as an “exhausted meaning” or as the annulment of signs, 
they can have “the beauty of an artifice.”41 
 
Coolness 
Bullshit is seductive when it provides a ‘weak’ type of information. Long 
before Baudrillard, Marshall McLuhan has called this type of information 
not weak but ‘cool.’ His idea of coolness helps to further clarify the 
functions of kitsch and bullshit. For McLuhan, ‘hot’ is any kind of 
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information that is highly defined or that “leaves not much to be filled in.”42 
Hot media favor analytical precision, quantitative analysis, and sequential 
ordering while ‘cool’ media leave the transmitted information open to 
interpretation or even partly unexplained. Speech is thus ‘cooler’ than 
highly defined images. 
 
Bullshit is Uncool 
McLuhan’s concept of coolness will most probably be viewed today 
through another idea of coolness, which has been developed in the form of 
a behavioral attitude practiced by black men in the United States at the time 
of slavery and residential segregation. Here ‘to be cool’ means mainly to 
remain calm even when being under stress. While blacks were not allowed 
to enter certain areas of the city at certain times, a cool attitude made it 
possible for them to walk streets at night or at least to deal with their 
oppressors in a dignified fashion. This coolness depended to a large extent 
on pretending. But whenever it appeared as pretentious, the behavior would 
not be seen as cool. If we accept this idea of bullshit as a lack of ‘coolness,’ 
Fania Pascal’s problem might turn out to be a simple ‘coolness’ problem. 
She did not stay cool, lost control and started talking ‘bullshit.’ Her 
behavior was ‘uncool’ just like that of somebody who recites Mallarmé’s 
“Dame sans trop d’ardeur” in a business meeting, or somebody who hangs 
an authentic Rembrandt in an elevator. Those are not seriously ethical 
errors but ethico-aesthetical mistakes. 
 
Bullshit Can be Cool 
Some facts concerning the cool perception or consumption of kitsch have 
been pointed out above. However, the production of bullshit can also be 
cool. The student who has cheated on the exam might believe that she is 
cool because she managed to delude an authoritarian system and got away 
with it. The ‘doing away’ with moral concerns brings this action close to 
bullshit. Yes, bullshit can be cool, but in that case, its existence will depend 
very much on its aesthetic arrangement. Most probably, bullshit will then 
come closer to cool kitsch. The bullshitter might get away with her 
distortion of reality because the style with which she commits the distortion 
aestheticizes the ethical default. This can be cool because ‘to be cool’ 
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means to remain calm even when taking considerable risks. The easiness, 
nonchalance, and feigned innocence with which bullshit often passes over 
premises that should be obvious to everybody, makes the bullshitter a risk 
taker. And anybody who takes risks without losing control is cool. Even 
more, we can say that the higher the risk the cooler the bullshit (provided 
that she can get away with it). This does not mean that the bullshit is 
entirely hidden under the aesthetic and that nobody recognizes the bullshit 
as such. But the aesthetic arrangement urges us to pass over the bullshit 
occurrence because the person is ‘bullshitting with style.’ 
This is closely linked to another point: the cool bullshitter does not 
care whether people believe in her claims or not. No caring about what 
other might say is actually cool by definition. Even more than in other 
cases, coolness has here nothing to do with ethics but only with how things 
are done. A bank robber can be cool while the most ethical person might be 
uncool. What matters is not the content of the speech or action but the 
bullshitter’s style or what Max Black has called the ‘stance’ of the one who 
produces humbug. Black means by stance “the speaker’s beliefs, attitudes, 
and evaluations”43 and we have identified the stance of the bullshitter not 
only as the intention to not lie or to bluntly conceal the truth, but also as a 
complex mixture of negligence, boldness, and nonchalance. The weighting 
of all those qualities is decisive for the fact whether bullshit is perceived as 
cool or not. Here we see the contrast with the aforementioned negative 
qualities: pretentiousness, self-deception and cheating make any attempted 
bullshit immediately uncool. 
Of course, bullshit becomes also uncool when it moves too close to 
blunt lying. The liar cannot be cool because she clearly hides the truth and 
is not ready to take any risk. Compared to lying, bullshitting appears more 
like a game (even as a game of hazard) and games are cool by definition. 
Bullshit is coolest when it stimulates a playful attitude towards itself, and 
this attitude is normally excluded from lying. Cool kitsch (which is 
arguably rarer than cool bullshit) is inscribed in this logic. Normally, kitsch 
is conservative and hostile towards risk taking. Normally the kitsch 
producer takes no risk but is eager to please. However, should he 
nevertheless get away with impressing an art-educated public with kitsch 
because there is “something” in it that is cool – then that artist would 
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indeed be cool. Strictly speaking, this would then no longer be kitsch but 
kitsch-art. It is cool because she was taking a maximum risk but she kept 
the situation under control. 
 
Cool and Cute 
In the above sections, kitsch and bullshit have been considered from both 
the receiver’s and the producer’s points of view. The difference between 
both needs to be made clearer in order to point out a paradox. While kitsch 
can certainly appear as cool to some people (the receivers), it needs to be 
clarified whether can kitsch really be cool (that is, be produced as cool). As 
a matter of fact, the kitsch-cool relationship is paradoxical. Primarily, 
kitsch has a preference for all that is sentimental, round, warm, soft, and 
fluffy and everything that is associated with slightly warmer temperatures. 
This is why normally kitsch cannot be cool. However, when kitsch 
manifests the same innocence (and perhaps even nonchalance) as bullshit, 
one might indeed detect traces of coolness in kitsch. Most of the time one 
would not call this ‘cool’ but rather ‘cute’. Often kitsch has been said to 
have a natural affinity with cuteness. Rosenberg points out that “when 
kitsch first began to spread in European cities, the liveliest poets found it 
cute.”44 Cuteness is not only the helplessness sparking exuberant emotion. 
“This is cute” can also signify recognition in terms of coolness similar to 
the world ‘charming’. 
Can bullshit be cute? It is difficult to think of examples but the 
possibility exists. Since the production of kitsch is not a serious ethical 
mistake, the producer of kitsch or the kitsch lover might get away with their 
kitsch for the same reason we pardon bullshit when it is committed by 
children. “But I only wanted to…” is a child’s excuse for having 
transformed the kitchen into a wetland and it comes across in the form of 
bullshit (the case where the liar desperately tries to become a bullshitter has 
been discussed above). Bullshit is cute when the bullshitter is trying to lie 
but she simply can’t. In general, kitsch belongs very much to the universe 
of children and bullshit must have some affinities with the childishness of 
kitsch expressions. It can be no coincidence that the Oxford English 
Dictionary equates the meaning of ‘bull’ to the word ‘trivial’ (though 
Frankfurt does not agree with this definition).45 In conclusion, we can say 
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that bullshit and kitsch can be cool when they take risks without losing 
control of the situation; and they can be charming and cute when they 
appear to be innocent. In all other cases they are most probably neither cool 
nor cute. 
 
Cool Self-Conscious Kitsch 
The last possibility for kitsch being cool is when it is produced in the form 
of ‘self-conscious kitsch’ (though Kundera would not recognize this as 
kitsch at all). Lebensztejn and Cooper affirm that by “appreciating kitsch 
and collecting its objects, the supercool amateur assures for himself a 
certificate of good taste and distinction.”46  Here kitsch can be freely 
combined with bullshit. A good example is the work of Jeff Koons, who is 
one of the most virtuous artists employing kitsch for the purpose of art; and 
he is also a master of bullshit, as is demonstrated by his declaration that 
Cicciolina (an Italian-Hungarian porn star and politician formerly married 
to Koons and featured in some of his work) “is the eternal virgin [because] 
she’s been able to remove guilt and shame from her life, and because of this 
she is a great liberator.”47 
 
Conclusion 
Baudrillard confirms that belief or make-believe “employ signs without 
credibility and gestures without referents; their logic is not one of 
mediation, but of immediacy, whatever the sign.”48 Kitsch and bullshit 
are among the most obvious examples of such techniques of make-
believe. Both try to outwit the critical mind. When this act of outwitting 
is playful it might be cool, and it becomes annoying when it is 
pretentious, which is the contrary of cool. One reason is that the 
pretentious person is no longer in control of the situation but believes (at 
least partly) in her own kitsch/bullshit. Then there is the case of the 
consumer who insists on the real value of kitsch and bullshit; she might 
also be classified as pretentious and not merely be pitied as a victim. 
It has become more important than ever to distinguish those 
patterns. At times of neoliberalism and social media, kitsch and bullshit 
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are on the increase (remember that Pennycook et al. classified Twitter’s 
140 characters formula as a recipe for “pseudo-profound bullshit”). 
Already Horkheimer and Adorno had pointed out that liberalism could be 
reproached for its lack of style.49 Today things are more complicated. 
Kitsch is not only determined by politics but politics can be determined by 
kitsch. This means that kitsch is more than a spontaneous neoliberal whim 
but the occurrence of kitsch is linked to comprehensive cultural systems 
fostering certain political behaviors. A renewed approach towards kitsch 
inspired by Frankfurt’s elaborations on bullshit as the deceptive 
misrepresentation of reality can help to reveal an ‘integral kitsch behavior’ 
in both private and public matters. 
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